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ECONOMIA DEL COMPORTAMENTO (LAUREA MAGISTRALE)
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BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
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Anno accademico 2013/2014
- Codice dell'attività didattica
- LET0156
- Docente
- Anna Maffioletti (Titolare dell'insegnamento)
- Corso di studi
- Corso di studio magistrale in Produzione e organizzazione della comunicazione e della conoscenza (Classe LM-59)
- Anno
- 1° anno 2° anno
- Tipologia
- Affine o integrativo
- Crediti/Valenza
- 6
- SSD dell'attività didattica
- SECS-P/01 - economia politica
SECS-P/02 - politica economica - Modalità di erogazione
- Tradizionale
- Lingua di insegnamento
- Italiano
- Modalità di frequenza
- Obbligatoria
- Tipologia d'esame
- Scritto
- Prerequisiti
- elementi di microeconomia
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Sommario insegnamento
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Obiettivi formativi
L'obiettivo del corso di Economia del Comportamento è quello di fornire agli studenti le basi teoriche e interpretative dell'economia moderna. Riesamiando alcune delle principali tematiche della economia neoclassica e dei suoi presupposti in termini di preferenze, concetto di razionalità e scelte massimizzanti e integrando tali contributi con nuovi modelli interpretativi derivanti in modo particolare dalla teoria delle decisioni e dalla psicologia cognitiva si cercherà di fornire gli strumenti gli elementi necessari di interpretazioni del comportamento economico degli agenti che possano poi essere applicati sia nei modelli di comunicazione sia nell'analisi e nella formulazioni delle politiche pubbliche sia nella analisi economica vera e propria.
The aim of the course in Behavioural Economics is to give to students the necessary theorethical background which can make them able to interpret modern economic systems. By an re-examination of the theoretical assumption in term of preferences rationality and maximisation behaviour of the economic agent embedded in the neoclassical economics, with the help of new instrument deriving from cognitive physiology and decision theory students will be given instruments and theoretical elements necessary to interpret the behaviour of the economic agent in the new complex economic system with application to public policy , communication and proper economic analysis.
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Risultati dell'apprendimento attesi
Gli studenti dovranno essere in grado di conoscere i nuovi strumenti teorici e di applicarli all'analisi del comportamento dei singoli agenti economici individui ed imprese tipico di un sistema econoico complesso con una paricolare attenzione ai problemi di comunicazione percezione del rischio e interazioni strategiche anche in culture o ambienti culturali distinti.
L'esame consiste per i non frequentanti in una prova scritta che comprende domande aperte e piccoli saggi su temi particolari. I frequentanti potranno svolgere parte dell'esame con lavoro in classe come presentazioni o discussioni articolate con la produzione di una mappa concettuale o di un saggio individuale o collettivo.
Students should be able to know new theoretical instruments, apply them to economic analysis and be able to analysis the complexity of economic behaviour of individual agents and firms with a particular attention to communication, perception of risk and interaction between agents in different cultural backgroundsExam will consisit in a witten test containing open questions and schor essays over single topics. For people following the classes coursework could sostitute part of the examination.
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Attività di supporto
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Programma
Concetto di razionalitàFondamenti di economia delle preferenze e dell’incertezzaEconomia sperimentaleUtilità attesaCritiche al concetto di UtilitàTeorie alternative all’utilitàTeoria dei giochiApplicazioni alla neuroeconomia, agli studi di genere e a differenze culturaliTheory of Choice and rationality conceptDecision making under risk and uncertaintyExperimental methodologyExpeted utility and criticismsElements of Behavioral Game theoryNeuroeconomics. experiments on gender differences and cultural differencesTesti consigliati e bibliografia
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- Per i non frequentanti le letture obbligatorie sono quelle con l'asterisco piu gli articoli di almeno altri due punti a scelta tra quelli elencati in bibliografia Non vi sono libri di testo ma si lavorerà su articoli originali. La bibliografia è divisa per temi. le letture di base sono quelle obbligatorie. 1 Razionalità • *Heap , Hollis, Lyons Sudgen and Weale The Theory of Choice Capitolo 1 Rationa • *Elster Jon (1996) Rationality and Emotions Economic Journal n106 1386-972 Utilità Attesa • *Chris Starmer “Developments in Non Expected Utility Theory : The Hant for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk” Journal of Economic Literature vol 38 June 2000 pp332 • *Machina M.(1987) “ Choice under uncertainty : Problem solved and Unsolved “ Economic Perspective vol 1 n. 1 121-124 • *Davis C e C.Holt Experimental Economics Charter I and Last 3 Economia sperimentale • Davis C e C.Holt Experimental Economics Charter I * and Last • Roth *On the early historiy of Experimental Economics http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~aroth/history.html • Davis, Douglas and Holt, Charles (1993); Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey: Chapter 1. • Falk, A. and Fehr, E. (2003); "Why labor market experiments?", Labour Economics 10, 399-406 (http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/falk/whylabourmEx.pdf). • Roth, Alvin E. (1988); "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview", Economic Journal, Vol. 98, 974-1031. • Smith, Vernon L. (1989); "Theory, Experiment and Economics", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 1, 151-169. • Smith, Vernon L. (1994); "Economics in the Laboratory", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 8, No. 1, 113-131. • Smith, Vernon L. (1976); "Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory", American Economic Review, Vol. 66, 274-279. 4 Invariance • Kahnemann D. A. Tversky (2000) “Choice Values and Frame” capitolo 1 • “Choice Values and Frame” eds Kahnemann D. A. Tversky Cambridge University Press 2000 • Kahnemann D. A. Tversky (1979)* „ Prospect Theory Econometrica 47 263-291 • Kahnemann D. A. Tversky (2002) Rational choice and framing of decisions chapter • Tversky ( 1993) *Constructive Preferences and Rational Choice atti della conferenza tenuta all’icer 5 Preference Reversal • Holt C. (1986) Preference Reversal and the Independence Axiom American Economic Review vol 76 n 3 • Tversky A. P. Slovic and D. Kahneman (1990)*“ The Causes of Preference Reversal “ American Economic Review vol 80 n. 1 • Loomes G. e R. Sugden “A rationale for preference Reversal” • American Economic Review June 1983 73, 428-32 6 Endowment Effect • D. Kahneman J. Kneutsch and R. Thaler (1990) Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coarse Theorem Journal of Political Economy 98 December 1325-48 • J. Kneutsch and J Sinden (1987) „ The persistence of Evaluation Disparities “Quartely Journal of Economics 99: 691-95 • J. Kneutsch (1979) The Endowment Effects and Evidence of Non Reversible Indifferent Curves American Economic Review , 79 5: 1277-84 • *Charles R. Plott Kathryn Zeiler (2005) “The Willingness to Pay/Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject • Misconceptions and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations • Department of the Humanities and Social Sciences Georgetown University Law CenterCalifornia Institute of Technology Washington, D.C. 20001 • Pasadena, California 91125 Mimeo 7 Alternative theory to EU • Chris Starmer “Developments in Non Expected Utility Theory : The Hant for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk” Journal of Economic Literature vol 38 June 2000 pp332 • *\Kahnemann D. A. Tversky (1979) „ Prospect Theory Econometrica 47 263-291 • Loomes G. and B. Sudgen (1982) “Regret Theory an alternative theory of Rational Choice under Ucertainty” Economic Journal December 1982 92 805-24 8 Fairness and Games • Charness, Gary, and Rabin, Matthew (2002); "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests", The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (3), 817 - 869 • Burrows P. G. Loomes THE IMPACT OF Fairness on Bargaining Behaviour Empirical Economics 1994 (19) 201-221 • Dawes M. R. Thaler Cooperation Journal of Economic PerspectiveVol “. N. £ pp 187-197 • Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., Riedl, A., 1993. Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 58, 437– 460. • Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, Christian Zehnder Fairness Perceptions and Reservation Wages—The Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wage Laws Quarterly Journal of Economics November 2006, Vol. 121, No. 4: 1347-1381. 9 Economics of Gender • Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences." Uri Gneezy, Muriel Niederle and Aldo Rustichini; Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003, 118(3), pp. 1049-74. • James Andreoni & Lise Vesterlund, 2001. "Which Is The Fair Sex? Gender Differences In Altruism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 293-312, February. Differences in the economic decisions of men and women:experimental evidence Catherine C. Eckel Philip J. Grossman Department of Economics Virginia Technology 10 Neuro economics • Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec The Journal of Economic Literature Vol. 43, No. 1, March 2005 • Rustichini Aldo 2005 Neuroeconomics Present and Future Games and Economic Behavioour 25 201-212 New Jersey: Chapter 1. 1 1incertezza e ignoranza comparativa *Ellsberg D. (1961) - “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axiom”,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, 643-69.Tversky A. and Fox C. (1995) - “Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 585-603.Heath Chip and Amos Tversky (1991)“Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in Choice Under Uncertaitny , ” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, ,4, 5: 28:53-71, • Chow Chua Clare and Radesh Sarin 2001 “Comparative Ignorance and the Ellsberg Paradox “Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
For who are not going to seat at the lectures the articles with asterix are cumpulsory plus all the articles contained in iat least two of the 11 points chosen by the students Non vi sono libri di testo ma si lavorerà su articoli originali. La bibliografia è divisa per temi. le letture di base sono quelle obbligatorie. 1 Razionalità • *Heap , Hollis, Lyons Sudgen and Weale The Theory of Choice Capitolo 1 Rationa • *Elster Jon (1996) Rationality and Emotions Economic Journal n106 1386-972 Utilità Attesa • *Chris Starmer “Developments in Non Expected Utility Theory : The Hant for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk” Journal of Economic Literature vol 38 June 2000 pp332 • *Machina M.(1987) “ Choice under uncertainty : Problem solved and Unsolved “ Economic Perspective vol 1 n. 1 121-124 • *Davis C e C.Holt Experimental Economics Charter I and Last 3 Economia sperimentale • Davis C e C.Holt Experimental Economics Charter I * and Last • Roth *On the early historiy of Experimental Economics http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~aroth/history.html • Davis, Douglas and Holt, Charles (1993); Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey: Chapter 1. • Falk, A. and Fehr, E. (2003); "Why labor market experiments?", Labour Economics 10, 399-406 (http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/falk/whylabourmEx.pdf). • Roth, Alvin E. (1988); "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview", Economic Journal, Vol. 98, 974-1031. • Smith, Vernon L. (1989); "Theory, Experiment and Economics", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 1, 151-169. • Smith, Vernon L. (1994); "Economics in the Laboratory", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 8, No. 1, 113-131. • Smith, Vernon L. (1976); "Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory", American Economic Review, Vol. 66, 274-279. 4 Invariance • Kahnemann D. A. Tversky (2000) “Choice Values and Frame” capitolo 1 • “Choice Values and Frame” eds Kahnemann D. A. Tversky Cambridge University Press 2000 • Kahnemann D. A. Tversky (1979)* „ Prospect Theory Econometrica 47 263-291 • Kahnemann D. A. Tversky (2002) Rational choice and framing of decisions chapter • Tversky ( 1993) *Constructive Preferences and Rational Choice atti della conferenza tenuta all’icer 5 Preference Reversal • Holt C. (1986) Preference Reversal and the Independence Axiom American Economic Review vol 76 n 3 • Tversky A. P. Slovic and D. Kahneman (1990)*“ The Causes of Preference Reversal “ American Economic Review vol 80 n. 1 • Loomes G. e R. Sugden “A rationale for preference Reversal” • American Economic Review June 1983 73, 428-32 6 Endowment Effect • D. Kahneman J. Kneutsch and R. Thaler (1990) Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coarse Theorem Journal of Political Economy 98 December 1325-48 • J. Kneutsch and J Sinden (1987) „ The persistence of Evaluation Disparities “Quartely Journal of Economics 99: 691-95 • J. Kneutsch (1979) The Endowment Effects and Evidence of Non Reversible Indifferent Curves American Economic Review , 79 5: 1277-84 • *Charles R. Plott Kathryn Zeiler (2005) “The Willingness to Pay/Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject • Misconceptions and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations • Department of the Humanities and Social Sciences Georgetown University Law CenterCalifornia Institute of Technology Washington, D.C. 20001 • Pasadena, California 91125 Mimeo 7 Alternative theory to EU • Chris Starmer “Developments in Non Expected Utility Theory : The Hant for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk” Journal of Economic Literature vol 38 June 2000 pp332 • *\Kahnemann D. A. Tversky (1979) „ Prospect Theory Econometrica 47 263-291 • Loomes G. and B. Sudgen (1982) “Regret Theory an alternative theory of Rational Choice under Ucertainty” Economic Journal December 1982 92 805-24 8 Fairness and Games • Charness, Gary, and Rabin, Matthew (2002); "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests", The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (3), 817 - 869 • Burrows P. G. Loomes THE IMPACT OF Fairness on Bargaining Behaviour Empirical Economics 1994 (19) 201-221 • Dawes M. R. Thaler Cooperation Journal of Economic PerspectiveVol “. N. £ pp 187-197 • Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., Riedl, A., 1993. Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 58, 437– 460. • Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, Christian Zehnder Fairness Perceptions and Reservation Wages—The Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wage Laws Quarterly Journal of Economics November 2006, Vol. 121, No. 4: 1347-1381. 9 Economics of Gender • Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences." Uri Gneezy, Muriel Niederle and Aldo Rustichini; Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003, 118(3), pp. 1049-74. • James Andreoni & Lise Vesterlund, 2001. "Which Is The Fair Sex? Gender Differences In Altruism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 293-312, February. • Differences in the economic decisions of men and women:experimental evidence Catherine C. Eckel Philip J. Grossman Department of Economics Virginia Technology 10 Neuro economics • Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec The Journal of Economic Literature Vol. 43, No. 1, March 2005 • Rustichini Aldo 2005 Neuroeconomics Present and Future Games and Economic Behavioour 25 201-212 New Jersey: Chapter 1. 1 1incertezza e ignoranza comparativa * Ellsberg D. (1961) - “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axiom”,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, 643-69.Tversky A. and Fox C. (1995) - “Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 585-603.Heath Chip and Amos Tversky (1991)“Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in Choice Under Uncertaitny , ” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, ,4, 5: 28:53-71, • Chow Chua Clare and Radesh Sarin 2001 “Comparative Ignorance and the Ellsberg Paradox “Journal of Risk and Uncertainty - Oggetto:
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